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Hans van Ees*
Stakeholder Democracy as a Katalyst to Corporate Value Creation?**
Abstract – The effectiveness of institutions of internal corporate governance, in particular the 
board of directors, is addressed from three theoretical perspectives. Corporate governance 
designs range from authoritarian, a single authority or controlling stakeholder, to democratic, 
shared authority and more controlling stakeholders. The distinction between the distribution of 
value created and value creation is introduced in the analysis as a relevant moderating variable. 
In case the emphasis is on the distribution of value created both the extended principal-agent 
perspective and the mediating hierarchy perspective on the corporation argue that stakeholders 
should not be represented in the board. Second, by building upon the mediating hierarchy 
perspective, in situations of multiple enfranchised stakeholders, it is most effective that all 
stakeholders transfer their control rights to the board,to enable relationship-specific 
investments. In case the analysis shifts to value creation, a strategic contingency perspective on 
corporate governance introduces the commitment and loyalty of stakeholders to the firm and 
their firm-specific and industry-specific experience and expertise as key soft-governance 
variables in the analysis of effective board behaviour. To the extent that these capabilities are 
distributed over multiple stakeholders, the effectiveness of governance is increased by having 
these stakeholders represented in the board.
Stakeholder-Demokratie als Katalysator für die Schaffung von 
Unternehmenswert?
Zusammenfassung – Die Effektivität von Corporate Governance-Institutionen, insbesondere des 
Vorstands, wird aus drei theoretischen Perspektiven betrachtet. Corporate Governance-Designs 
reichen von autoritären Formen mit ungeteilter Autorität bzw. einem einzigen kontrollierenden 
Stakeholder bis hin zu demokratischen Formen mit geteilter Autorität und mehreren leitenden 
Stakeholdern. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der Verteilung des geschaffenen Werts und der Schaf-
fung von Wert wird als wichtige moderierende Variable in die Analyse einbezogen. Wird die Vertei-
lung des Werts betont, sollten Stakeholder sowohl nach Ansicht der erweiterten Principal Agent- als 
auch der Mediating Hierarchy-Perspektive nicht im Vorstand vertreten sein. Gemäß der Mediating 
Hierarchy-Perspektive ist es in Situationen mit Stimmrechtsübertragung außerdem am effektivsten, 
wenn alle Stakeholder ihre Kontrollrechte an den Vorstand abgeben, um beziehungsspezifische 
Investitionen zu ermöglichen. Konzentriert sich die Analyse auf die Schaffung von Wert, werden 
aus einer Strategic Contingency-Perspektive die Bindung und Loyalität von Stakeholdern zu ihrer 
Firma sowie ihre firmen- und branchenspezifische Erfahrung und Expertise als Schlüsselvariablen 
der Soft Governance berücksichtigt. Sofern diese Fähigkeiten über mehrere Stakeholder verteilt 
sind, wird die Effektivität der Governance verbessert, wenn diese Stakeholder im Vorstand vertre-
ten sind. 
Key words: Effective Corporate Governance, Board of Directors,
Multiple Enfranchised Stakeholders
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1.  Introduction1
Corporate governance structures the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders (Aoki 
2001) and the nature of the relationships between the firm, i.e. top management, and 
its stakeholders. By shaping the bargaining positions over the rents of firm and 
allocating risks over different stakeholder groups, institutions of corporate governance 
affect the incentives to contribute resources to the firm. From this perspective, 
institutions of corporate governance, such as the board of directors, affect the 
commitment of stakeholders to corporate activities.
Building upon that argument, the research objective of this paper is to analyse to 
what extent the existence of multiple enfranchised stakeholders, besides shareholders, 
also implies a more democratic nature of effective corporate governance. In particular, 
we will analyse to what extent multiple enfranchised stakeholders do imply that more 
democratic corporate governance structures, such as the German regime of codeter-
mination, are more effective to sustain the competitive advantage of the firm.
Our analysis starts in section two with a short digression on the changing nature 
of business and the modern firm in order to illustrate the relevance of research objec-
tive. Subsequently, the paper takes up the research question from three alternative 
theoretical perspectives. In section three, the research question is addressed from the 
extended principal-agent perspective, the dominant model in the corporate govern-
ance literature. It is concluded that this model offers a straightforward (negative) an-
swer to the research question but that the underlying arguments are subject to criti-
cism. In order to seek to overcome these theoretical deficiencies, section four intro-
duces the mediating hierarchy perspective on the corporation as introduced by Blair 
and Stout in an article on a team production theory of corporate law (1999). The me-
diating hierarchy perspective develops the proposition that particularly, by transferring 
control to an independent board, stakeholders enable relationship-specific 
investments that may favorably affect the competitive advantage of the firm. Similarly, 
it can be argued that in situations of multiple enfranchised stakeholders it is more 
efficient to centralize decision-making power beyond the discretionary powers of 
stakeholders.
In section five, it is concluded that both theoretical approaches have in common 
the emphasis on the distribution of value created, on the one hand, and the general 
applicability of the recommended design of effective corporate governance, on the 
other. In section six of the paper, an organizational-theoretic perspective is introduced 
into the analysis, which puts a larger emphasis on strategy and value creation, as such 
and extends the previous literature by introducing several governance-related industry 
and technology contingencies that may to qualify the overall validity of the answers 
                                                          
1  This paper grew out of discussions on substantially different paper on this topic pre-
sented at the Academy of Management Meeting in Seattle, August 2003 and the confer-
ence on Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Nexuses and Frontiers  at Bocconi Univer-
sity, Milan, 5-6 December 2002. The comments and suggestions of the participants of 
these conferences are gratefully acknowledged as well as, the contributions to earlier 
drafts of Theo Postma and SOM Research master student Qin Lin in developing some of 
the ideas of this paper.
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offered by the aforementioned approaches. Finally, section seven offers some 
conclusions and discusses the opportunities for subsequent research. 
2.  The changing nature of business 
When discussing corporate governance, the stylized conception of a corporation is a 
large asset-intensive firm, with clear-cut organisational boundaries and control 
concentrated at the top. The firm’s competitive advantage arises from economies of 
scale and scope and the business environment of the text-book corporation is 
characterized by limited competition in in- and output markets, disfavouring the 
power of the stakeholders. Employees have limited outside opportunities, which 
enables the corporation to exert considerable corporate power over specialised human 
capital. The unique capabilities of the corporation reside primarily in physical capital 
assets and the efficient scale of the firm requires massive external funding, and hence, 
dispersed ownership. The latter creates a concentration of power at the top of the 
firm as the control rights of the dispersed shareholders are transferred to 
knowledgeable top managers. Shareholders are considered to be the only residual 
claimants, implying that maximising shareholder value is identical to maximising firm 
value. In this context, the problem of effective corporate governance is predominantly 
a problem of structuring and protecting shareholder rights (principal-agent problem). 
The business environment of the 21th century fundamentally differs from the 
environment of the text-book corporation (Barkema et al. 2002). In the first place, the 
nature of competition has changed. Deregulation and globalization have increased the 
liquidity of most markets. The increased liquidity and the growth of modern financial 
markets have created more exit options for financial stakeholers and increased their 
bargaining power relative to other stakeholders. More intense competition in output 
markets has increased customer power and the need for continuous differentiation 
and innovation to sustain competitive advantage. The importance of economies of 
scale as a source of competitive advantage has diminished and the shrinking lead time 
of innovations and the importance of time to market have increased the importance 
of non-technical innovations, intangible assets and human capital (Baruch Lev 2001). 
In the second place, the surge of ICT-technology has changed the nature of 
organisation. Communication and co-ordination costs have fallen dramatically, which 
offers opportunites to (groups of) relatively small firms to challenge the efficiency 
standards of large conglomerates. Large conglomerates have been broken up and 
looser forms of cooperation between independent firms have become more 
important. In this context, the ability to integrate with other business partners is 
becoming more and more a core competence. In the third place, the nature of work 
has changed. Along with the intensified competition and technological advancements, 
service industries and the service components in other industries have developed into 
the most important drivers of value creation (Quinn/Baruch/Zein 1997). Also this 
development has increased the importance of non-technical innovations, intangible 
assets and human capital. 
As far as the consequences of these developments for the enterprise are 
concerned, it can be observed that in the first place, most of the aforementioned 
strategic changes imply a shift of decision-making power from the top to the lower 
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levels of the organisation or outside the organisation (Rajan/Zingales 2000). In the 
second place, it is relevant to observe that the property rights on human capital reside 
with individuals and cannot easily be transferred to the corporation. In the third place, 
the residual risks of corporate activities are more often shared by different stakeholder 
groups, including employees. Therefore, it can be argued that the changing nature of 
business implies that the corporation of the 21th century is characterised by more 
enfranchised stakeholders, besides shareholders.
3.  The extended principal-agent perspective  
In the context of an extended principal-agent perspective on effective corporate gov-
ernance, the firm is considered as a unique bundle of complementary relationship-
specific assets under common ownership. Stakeholder investments, i.e. transactions 
between the firm and the stakeholders that concern the transfer of the ownership 
rights on the assets to corporation, are governed by contracts. Emphasizing the legal 
entity of the corporation, the firm can be denoted as a nexus of contracts, (William-
son, 1985). The transfer of ownership concentrates decision-making power at the top 
of the organization in the hands of top management, the knowledgeable professionals 
contracted to manage and control corporate activities so as to maximize the firm va-
lue. The bilateral principal-agent problem arises to the extent that the interests of the 
managers conflict with the interests of the stakeholders in situation where the 
associated principal-agent contracts are incomplete (Zingales 1997, 2000; Ra-
jan/Zingales 2000). In the organizational context, the principal-agent problem is one 
of the manifestations of the complex multilateral bargain about the distribution of 
value created (rents) by the organization. In a more general perspective, this bargain is 
shaped by the allocation of decision rights in situations not foreseen in contracts, 
given the ex ante allocation of property rights, the exit options of the stakeholders and 
the wider governance context, i.e. the judicial system, the transparency of markets, 
professional norms, etc. When contracts are complete all possible conflicts of interest 
can be taken into account at the time the investment decisions is taken. However, 
contracts are not fully contingent. As a result, problems of moral hazard and hold up 
emerge. Corporate governance institutions allocate residual control rights, which give 
agents (managers, shareholders, employees) decision-making power in situations not 
foreseen in contracts (Grossman/Hart 1986; Hart 1995; Boot/Macey 1999). 
Through its impact on the distribution of the value, the corporate governance 
structure may also affect the creation of value (Rajan/Zingales 2000: 7). In the first 
place, the ex post bargaining position of stakeholders affects the ex ante incentive to 
invest in relationship-specific assets. In the second place, institutions of corporate 
governance affect co-ordination and negotiation costs. For instance, costs may rise as 
a result of activities directed towards getting a larger share of the surplus instead of 
creating the surplus. In the third place, the ex post bargaining position may affect the 
distribution of risk among stakeholders (e.g. shareholders vs. employees).
Effective corporate governance structures allocate this risk to stakeholders with 
the smallest risk-aversion (Jensen/Meckling 1976), minimize costs and create the 
highest incentives to engage in value-creating activities so as to achieve the highest 
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commitment of stakeholders to the corporation. Similarly, in a business context where 
the risks of value creation are shared among stakeholders (more enfranchised stake-
holders), the surplusses will be shared more evenly among these groups, for instance, 
through performance contracts. On the other hand, if stakeholders share control 
rights (multiple principals) as in codetermination, there is the risk of no decision. To 
cut through this dilemma, the stakeholder with the highest residual risks to loose (re-
sidual) income, is given the residual control rights, as this is the stakeholder with the 
highest monetary incentive to effectively monitor the others. To increase effective 
monitoring, this activity is best delegated to a body of professional agents, the board 
of directors. By implication of the principal-agent solution, all other stakeholders will 
invest sub-optimally, but this is the inevitable characteristic of constrained second-
best. As the focus of the principal-agent perspective is on control and the distribution 
of value created, the constrained-best corporate governance structure achieves stake-
holder co-operation through enhancing monitoring ability. In this context, the virtues 
of corporate governance objectives, such as accountability, transparency, and integrity 
are primarely relevant as they may improve monitoring abilities of the stakeholder that 
bears the (highest) residual risk.
To conclude, the extended principal-agent perspective with its exclusive emphasis 
on control does not support the proposition that a more democratic governance 
structure will be more effective in situations in which the residual risks to income 
losses are more evenly shared among the different stakeholders of the firm. That 
being said, it can also be argued that the principal-agent perspective does only provide 
support for the shareholder-primacy model to the extent that shareholders are the 
(only) residual claimants. Moreover, in a business where the unique firm-specific 
resources are distributed more evenly among the stakeholders, the monitoring 
stakeholder still has to develop capabilties to be able to associate effectively with the 
other stakeholders. The virtues of corporate governance are helpful in this respect, but 
the current developments in business give no ground for the idea that formal 
authority should be shared among stakeholders at the top of the organization.
The extended principal-agent perspective is subject to the following criticism. In 
the first place, the theory assumes that it is clear from the outset, who the principal 
and who the agent are. Formally, only the principal makes specific investments. As has 
been argued in the introduction, particularly the changing nature of business has 
increased the likelihood that both parties contribute specific inputs to the firm. In the 
second place, to assume that common ownership is the natural back-up for common 
control creates a sharp distinction between “the owners” of the corporation and other 
stakeholders, whose services are assumed to be hired on explicit, fully contingent 
contracts. In the third place, taking the view that the firm is a bundle of assets, 
commonly owned by the shareholders, neglects the existence of firm-specific human 
capital that resides with the employees. And finally, in the fourth place, by 
emphasizing control and value protection, the extended principal-agent perspective 
overemphasizes the relevance of vertical (hierarchical) relationships for value-creating 
activities and neglects the impact of lateral interaction on productive activities. 
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4.  The mediating hierarchy perspective on the corporation 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) were among the first economists to explore the prob-
lematic nature of team production, i.e. the production of nonseparable output with 
the use of several resources, provided by different individuals. According to Blair and 
Stout (1999), the fundamental problem of a public corporation is not the (extended) 
principal-agent problem but the team production problem. “The essence of organiza-
tion is to be found in the fact that productive activities require the combined relation-
ship-specific investment and coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups” 
(Blair/Stout 1999: 249). In case the joint output of the firm (“the team”) is nonsepa-
rable, it will be problematic to determine how the rents of the firm are divided. As in 
the extended principal-agent perspective, the assumption of rational self-interested 
individual behaviour implies that ex ante distribution rules invite free-riding in a team 
and ex post rules opportunistic behaviour and rent seeking. Indeed in case the team 
output is (e.g. equally) divided among team members it is always rational to free ride 
on the team, as team members enjoy al the benefits of shirking, but will only bear a 
fraction of the costs. To cut through this dilemma and to let each team member bear 
the full costs of his shirking, all team members will have to suffer in case any one of 
them shirks. However, that solution is theoretically not feasible as the budget con-
straint is broken. If the team generates a surplus but not enough to “prove” that no 
one shirked, where does the undistributed surplus go? Holmstrom (1982), in a princi-
pal-agent model, has formally derived that the arrangement of an outsider, who ab-
sorbs the team surplus, should the team not meet the target, i.e. in the event of shirk-
ing, generates the appropriate group incentive to co-operate and not to shirk as well as 
satisfies the budget constraint. Fundamentally important in this respect is that the 
outsider cannot manipulate the efforts of the individual team members. The introduc-
tion of the outsider has been interpreted, also by Holmstrom, as providing a rationale 
for the separation of ownership and labour in corporations with the shareholders 
being the owners. However, Blair and Stout reject that interpretation on the argument 
that the shareholders are in fact part of the team and cannot be considered as outsid-
ers. Instead, they argue it is the legal entity of the corporation itself that serves as the 
outsider as it is the (public) corporation itself “that holds title to the firm’s assets and 
serves as the repository for all its residual returns until they are paid out to sharehold-
ers and other stakeholders” (Blair/Stout 1999: 269). It is the particularly the collabora-
tion between all team members (the stakeholders) that generates the value and hence 
it is in the collective interest of all stakeholders to minimize shirking and rent-seeking. 
Particularly when teams grow larger, the institutionalization of outsider-control with-
out the ability of the outsider to affect team performance is required to assure coop-
eration. This institutionalization can be denoted as the incorporation of the team, 
which is the arrangement by which all the property rights on the assets are transferred 
to a new legal entity, the corporation. The control of the corporation is given to a 
board of directors, a body of disinterested outsiders, who has ultimate decision-
making authority how to use the assets, to hire and fire future company directors and 
to resolve any internal dispute between the members (stakeholders) of the organiza-
tion (the mediating hierarchy). In the mediating hierarchy perspective on the firm, the 
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board of directors at the top of the hierarchy mediates in internal disputes and solves 
stakeholder conflicts so as to enable specialized investments.
In return for the transfer of their ownership rights, stakeholders receive claims on 
the rents of the organization. The nature of these claims can be different across stake-
holders, e.g. in terms of the distinction between residual and non-residual claims. Ho-
wever, more important than this is that none of the stakeholders owns the (public) 
corporation, it is an entity separate of its participants. The corporation itself owns the 
assets contributed by the stakeholders for use in production, as well as, any produced 
output. This ownership structure is considered as an effective solution to the hold-up 
problem as all the members of the team (i.e. the stakeholders) voluntary give up in 
advance the opportunity to hold up the enterprise.
As far as control at the top of the organization is concerned, the mediating hier-
archy perspective implies that the board of directors is accountable to the corporation 
only. Directors are supposed to operate in the best interest of the firm by protecting 
the relationship-specific investments of all stakeholders, and, not necessarily only the 
rights of the shareholders. Team production suggests that corporate performance 
should be measured along a manifold of dimensions (return on assets, liabilities, 
wages, creditor accounts, customer satisfaction, growth of the firm etc.). Corporate 
governance arrangements are primarily designed to facilitate the cooperation and co-
ordination within the team, or alternatively, among stakeholders. This includes guaran-
teeing the claims of the stakeholders, preventing hold-up among stakeholders, mediat-
ing between stakeholders and undertaking (strategic) activities that benefit the corpo-
ration. In this respect, the position of residual claimants is particularly important. The 
mediating hierarchy of a corporation can be seen as an efficient substitute for explicit 
contracting in situations where more than one stakeholder contributes to the firm by 
investing relationship-specific assets. Directors do not formally represent particular 
stakeholder groups; otherwise stakeholders would be able to exploit their power over 
the board to attempt a hold up (Blair/Stout 1999: 254). Similarly, strategic decisions 
should not be subjected in great detail to the approval of stakeholders. Instead, direc-
tors are supposed to re-enforce trust, corporate commitment and co-operation among 
stakeholders. The virtues of corporate governance, transparency, integrity and ac-
countability, serve to achieve these objectives.
In order to be able to fulfill their duties to the organization, board members have 
full discretion. This obviously implies that the mediating hierarchy model offers large 
potential for board members to serve their own interests. Against that proposition, it 
can first of all be argued that stakeholders will trade off the risks on agency costs 
against the costs of shirking and rent-seeking in the production of output. After all, 
the world is considered second-best. Therefore, also the team production model 
cannot offer the first-best solution. In the second place, as an institution of corporate 
governance, the ruling of the board will be constrained by the wider institutional envi-
ronment (e.g. the law or national codes of corporate governance). Particularly, 
corporate law can be restrictive (e.g. The Sarbanes – Oxley act in the United States) 
and the transparency and accountability requirements in national codes of corporate 
of corporate governance can create a considerable damage to reputation in the case of 
the abuse of power by board members. In the third place, boards can effectively 
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structure their efforts so as maintain their reputation of impartiality and loyalty to the 
firm. Their status of disinterested trustees, distinct from employees, can, for instance, 
be reenforced by flat compensation schemes and the absence of stock ownership and 
careful board member selection procedures, focusing on competence and integrity 
rarther than on stakeholder representation. Finally, powerful social and cultural norms 
related to trustworthiness may prevent the systamic abuse of the position of a member 
of the board.
Concerning the (s)election of the board of directors and the issue of the share-
holder voting rights in this respect, Blair and Stout (1999: 309) argue that these voting 
rights are largely instrumental and in no way pinpoint to a subordination of the board 
to the shareholders. By contrast, the issue of shareholder voting rights is defended by 
the argument that shareholders are in the best position to withstand the board in the 
interest of all the stakeholders (the corporate coalition). This is because the interests 
of shareholder are relatively homogeneous and their bargaining position is generally 
stronger in view of the liquidity of capital markets. By no means, the prevailing exis-
tence of the limited voting rights of shareholders does imply that shareholders are 
supposed to control the board. At best, the limited voting rights can be seen as a 
compensating for a relatively vulnerable position within the firm, as shareholders are 
not as involved in the firm’s day-to-day operations, as many other stakeholders are. 
On the other hand, it has also to be acknowledged that limited liability and easy exit 
options do reduce the vulnerability of the shareholders. Nevertheless, granting addi-
tional voting rights to other stakeholder groups, such as employees, would probably 
only increase the costs of voting without adding to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the (s)election and other decision-making procedures.
To conclude, the team-production theory with its emphasis on team production, 
co-operation and coordination does not support the proposition that a more 
democratic governance structure will be more effective in situations where the residual 
risks to value-creation are more evenly shared among the different stakeholders of the 
firm. To the contrary, the team-production model argues that although the 
stakeholders (including the employees) may select the board and board members may 
even represent different stakeholders groups, once installed the board enjoys ultimate 
decisionmaking authority. It is important to emphasize that this position does not 
necessarily argue against the alleged efficiency of giving other stakeholders besides 
shareholders the right to select board members (see also Gorton and Schmid 2004). 
The crucial emphasis is on the formal authority distribution after the board has been 
selected. In a mediating hierarchy perspective the board itself is the highest decision-
making authority, which implies that stakeholders transfer their control rights to the 
board in order to facilitate relationship-specific investments from all stakeholders. 
Obviously, the board of directors has to develop capabilities to be able to associate 
effectively with all the stakeholders and to assure credibility of the board. The virtues 
of corporate governance, integrity, transparency and accountability are essential in this 
respect so as to maintain the relationships with the stakeholders and to legitimize the 
decision-making power of the board. There’s no theoretical foundation for the idea 
that formal control rights should be shared among stakeholders at the top of the 
organization, nor that stakeholders should be represented in the board. Board 
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members are better seen as trustees rather than as agents, who mediate in disputes and 
solve conflicts so as to facilitate specialized investments. The effectivenes of internal 
corporate governance is best guaranteed by an independent board of directors 
(Hermalin/Weisbach 2001), although the notion of indepedence is subject to debate 
in this respect (McNulty/Roberts/Stiles 2005).
When dealing with the prevailing dominance of the shareholder-primacy model in 
the current business world, it is interesting to observe the alternative explanations 
offered by the extended principal-agent perspective, on the one hand, and, the 
mediating hierarchy perspective , on the other. The former would explain shareholder 
primacy as being the result of an efficiency principle. Shareholders hold the majority 
of the residual risks and hence, are most committed to closely monitor corporate 
activities. Ownership in this respect is considered to be the most powerful back-up of 
residual control rights. Interestingly, for closely held corporations and private firms, 
the proponents of the mediating hierarchy perspective on the firm do accept that 
explanation, but not for public corporations. In that context, shareholder primacy is 
better explained from a political perspective. In their view, the correct argument 
would be that the changes in the nature of busines and markets have shifted the 
balance of power toward financial stakeholders. There’s no theoretical argument why 
this should promote effective corporate governance, let alone the creation of value. 
To the contrary, the pervasive impact of shareholders on corporate decision-making is 
more likely to increase the probability of hold-up by the shareholders and sub-optimal 
(non-committed) investment behaviour by other stakeholders. The sometimes 
observed emphasis on short-term profits at the expense of investments in innovative 
activities can perhaps be regarded as an illustration of opportunistic behaviour by the 
shareholder groups. 
5.  An assessment of the extended principal-agent and the mediating-
hierarchy perspectives 
As the extended principal- agents perspective, the validity of mediating hierarchy 
perspective on the firm is subject to qualifications and criticism. In the first place, also 
Blair and Stout (1999: 281) argue that their perspective does particularly apply to large 
publicly held firms. When ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
shareholders, who also have the statutory right to select and appoint the board, the 
extended principal-agent perspective probably better describes the actual governance 
situation. In the second place, it is important to emphasize that their statutory position 
at the top of organization does not imply that the board is incorporating the 
management function (Fama/Jensen 1983). The status of the board is more captured 
by the fact that the board is able to take the ultimate decisions rather than that the 
board actually takes them.
More fundamentally, it can be observed in the third place that both theoretical 
approaches particularly address the formal and structural characterics of corporate 
governance (van Ees et al. 2005). A growing number of organizational-theoretic stud-
ies have emphasized the need to study more closely the behavioural practices, proc-
esses and relationships within the firm and between the firm and its environment. In 
this perspective, firms are conceptualized as complex sets of human relationships and 
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resources, where the development of routines plays a major role in keeping the inter-
nal coherence (Zahra/Filatotchev 2004). Moreover, the cognitive ability of organiza-
tional actors to effectively collect and process information is generally considered to 
be limited (Rindova 1999; Zahra/Filatotchev 2004), which may lead to the need to 
create and coordinate dispersed knowledge through various planning and control 
systems. Hence, from this organizational-theoretic perspective, in the first place effec-
tive institutions of corporate governance create value, not primarily by solving con-
flicts of interests and disputes, but more by facilitating (new) knowledge and value 
creation, offering advice and coordinating of stakeholder expectations and activities. 
Indeed, from an organizational-theoretic perspective, the relationship between 
corporate performance and corporate governance, which underlies the notion of 
effective corporate governance is subject to qualifications. In general, the creation of 
corporate value results from the dynamic interaction of resource deployment and 
resource development through organizational learning. Existing business opportuni-
ties are more intensively explored, new opportunities for business are developed and 
new organizational assets are created. The emphasis on cumulative and collective crea-
tion and organizational development, creates a problem for both the extended princi-
pal-agent perspective as well as the mediating hierarchy perspective on corporate gov-
ernance, as both theories are built upon the assumption of a given predetermined set 
of investment opportunities and well-defined property rights. To put it differently, the 
assumption that the actors are fundamentally unaware of possible contingencies and 
do not understand the business environment the operate in is crucial. Indeed, also 
with multiple enfranchised stakeholders, corporate governance in these approaches 
concerns the distribution of the returns associated with a given set of investment op-
portunities among the stakeholders with a stake in the selected investment projects. 
Apparently, this approach does not allow for the possibility that the returns on stake-
holder investments are generated from the discovery of new opportunities and re-
sources, where the property rights to the new assets reside with the organization itself 
rather than that they are attributable to particular stakeholder groups.
In the second place, the emphasis on value and resource creation and strategy in 
organizational-theoretic perspective implies that the general validity of the conclusions 
offered by both the extended principal-agent perspective and the mediating hierarchy 
perspective on the corporation may be criticised. The basic argument underlying con-
tingency thinking in organization theory is that uniform an optimal organisational 
design does not exist. On other hand, not all designs are equally good, implying that 
particular combinations (fits) of organizational, functional and contextual characteris-
tics provide better results than others. In the next section, we apply an organisational-
theoretic analysis of corporate governance to situations with multiple enfranchised 
stakeholders and elaborate upon the industry and technology-based contingencies that 
may affect the effectiveness of the institutions of corporate govenance, in particular 
the board of directors. 
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6.  An organizational-theoretic analysis of the corporate performance- 
corporate governance nexus 
In addressing the implications of the design of effective institutions of corporate gov-
ernance, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that the dynamic and cumulative na-
ture of value creation processes implies a much larger scope for institutions of corpo-
rate governance. Value creation processes in firms can be characterized as develop-
mental (1), implying the commitment of resources to irreversible investments for a 
prolonged period; organizational (2), i.e. resources are allocated to facilitate organiza-
tional learning and the integration of human competencies and physical resources and 
strategic (3), implying that resources are allocated to activities that are expected to 
create sustainable competitive advantage. As a result, when dealing with effective cor-
porate governance, not only the distribution of the returns should be taken into ac-
count, but also the nature of the investment itself and the involvement and commit-
ment of the stakeholders in the investment processes (Lazonick 1998; Lazonick/ 
O’Sullivan 2000; O’Sullivan 2000). In this respect, the degree of commitment will be 
conditional upon the nature of the relationships between the stakeholders and the 
firm. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) particularly focus on the determinants of finan-
cial commitment, but the notion of commitment can be extended to other stake-
holders, e.g. workers, top management, as well. For instance, similar to blockholding, 
high firm-specific investments in human capital are generally associated with a high 
commitment and loyalty of employees. In addition, the organisation of corporate gov-
ernance will affect the organizational integration, as the organizational setting creates 
incentives for the integration of resources and competences and cumulative learning. 
This strategic dimension of the relationship between the stakeholders and the 
firm is focused upon value creation. It is concerned with the provision of essential 
services and resources in strategic decision-making, such as expert advice, legitimacy 
and counsel, as well as links to important external resources and other organisations. 
In contrast, the control dimension is directed towards the distribution of value created 
and safeguarding the interests of the residual claimants. Whereas, the extended princi-
pal-agent perspective and the mediating hierarchy perspective primarily focus upon 
effective value distribution, the organizational-theoretic approach is more concerned 
with value creation, as such. Particularly, the balance between the value-creation and 
value distribution, as incorporated in alternative corporate governance institutions, will 
favourably influence corporate performance and the underlying allocation of resources 
to cumulative learning processes.
The strategic perspective on the effectiveness of corporate governance also im-
plies that the relationship between the institutions of corporate governance and 
performance may vary across contexts and technology. Indeed, the creation of value 
in different industries can be characterised along different dimensions. In the first 
place, by type, i.e by the emphasizing the creation of (new) products, processess and 
organisational development. In the second place, by nature, incremental or radical 
change or development and in the third place, by the distribution of expenditures over 
tangible and intangible assets. Moreover, this variation may change over time.
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In line with the variation in industry and technology characteristics, the following 
governance-related industry constructs can be defined (Tylecotte 1999; van Ees/ 
Postma 2002). The first construct is denoted, visibility, which can be defined as the 
extent in which stakeholders not closely involved in the value-creating process are able 
to judge what resources are being devoted to it and how efficiently they are used. The 
more complex the transformation process, the lower visibility and the more difficult 
control. The low degree of visibility increases residual risks and may affect funding 
and other relationship-specific investments. Generally, in the context of low visibility, 
stakeholders need firm-specific expertise to contribute effectively to processes of 
strategy and control. In the second place, novelty, the extent in which value-creation 
processes are built upon the development of radically new technologies. Novelty 
relates to the technology nature of value-creating processes and affects monitoring 
capabilities, resource characteristics and risk attitudes. The higher novelty, the greater 
the industry-specific knowledge needed for effective governance. In the third place, 
appropriability refers to the non-rivalry and non-excludability characteristics of value 
creation processes. Low appropriability reflects diffuse patterns of residual decision 
rights. Sometimes, decision rights are concentrated in the hands of stakeholders with 
decisive information (patent rights, complementary tangible assets), which increases 
appropriability. For instance, patenting regulates the protection of corporate 
intellectual property rights and offers the owners of the patent a well-defined claim to 
the rents of the patent-protected activities. On the other hand, partnerships are usually 
associated with more dispersed decisive information. In such a context, the 
corporation may not be able to capture all the rents from value-creating activities or, is 
the appropriation of the rents more diffuse.
Applied to institutions of corporate governance and in particular to the board of 
directors, a contingency approach to the effectiveness of alternative configurations of 
corporate governance in terms of value creation will be related to the aforementioned 
three industry and technology characteristics (see Table 1).
Table 1:  Effective corporate governance at the firm level 
  High levels of stakeholder 
commitment and loyalty are 
achieved by  
High levels of organizational 
integration are achieved by  





Low Informal network-based  
stakeholder relationships 
Emphasis on strategy (quasi-
insider) dominated boards 





Low Informal network-based  
stakeholder relationships 
Emphasis on strategy (quasi-
insider) dominated boards





Low Informal network-based  
stakeholder relationships 
Emphasis on strategy (quasi-
insider) dominated boards 
The corporate governance institutions in Table 1 are characterized at the level of the 
firm. The focus is on the composition and expertise of the board of directors and the 
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diffusion of decision rights among stakeholders, including top managers and (other) 
employees. In this respect, a large diffusion of control rights is associated with net-
work-based relationships and a small more concentrated dispersion with market-based 
stakeholder relationships. The configurations in Table 1 allow the following conclu-
sions. Particularly in contexts of low visibility, low novelty and low appropriability, the 
board of directors can be seen as an institution of corporate governance, relevant for 
establishing organizational integration and high organizational commitment and loy-
alty of stakeholders. On the other hand, in situations high visibility, high novelty, and 
high appropriability, market-based control and incentive systems may elicit the re-
quired relationship-specific investments from stakeholders. With alienable assets and 
high visibility in production, market control will allocate property rights to the first 
best use of the assets. In line with this observation, an outsider-dominated board of 
non-specialist directors, emphasizing the control function of the board will be most 
effective. To the extent that assets are thick, not standardized, connected and non-
alienable as with human capital and low visibility characterizes technology, more co-
operative and network-based decision-making structures may direct resources more 
efficient (Kogut/Sauder 1992). In line with this observation it can be argued that in-
sider-dominated boards of directors emphasizing the strategy role of the board will be 
more effective.
In industries characterized by low visibility, low novelty and low appropriability, 
successful performance at the firm level will particularly be associated with long-term 
network-based (stakeholder) relationships. New organizational forms, based on more 
voluntary co-operation are seen as particularly efficient for the productive sourcing of 
thick assets or bundles of non-alienable assets. In such a context, boards may delegate 
decision rights after having establishment the objectives to be reached. Obviously, this 
also requires monitoring and the ultimate decision rights, however, the emphasis is 
more on achieving commitment, active involvement and the ability to associate. In 
this line of reasoning, a more passive use of centralized authority may have a place in 
industries where visibility, novelty and appropriability are low. To conclude, in case 
firm-specific assets, including human capital are fundamentally distributed and the 
characteristics of production and technology are not easy to access by external 
stakeholders, the maintainance of the relationships with and between the different 
stakeholders will dominate over the exercise of control over productive activities. 
Institutions of corporate governance and in particular, the board of directors, may 
contribute to value creation in this respect, by decreasing relational risk and building 
trust and loyalty between stakeholders.
7.  Conclusion, effective corporate governance in relation to 
organizational democracy 
In this paper, the effectiveness of institutions of internal corporate governance, and in 
particular the board of directors, has been addressed from three rather different 
theoretical perspectives, the principal-agent perspective, the mediating hierarchy 
perspective on the corporation and the organizational-theoretic perspective. It has 
been argued that the emphasis of the former two perpectives is on the formal 
characteristics of corporate governance in relation to primarily the distribution of 
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value created. Both approaches are built upon the fundamental assumption that the 
value of productive activities is known beforehand, although not with certainty. 
However, the actual added value can also deviate negatively because of incentive 
problems, free-rider problems and rent-seeking activities. As a result, the emphasis is 
on the design of effective control of behaviour the may affect the distribution of value 
created and indirectly create efficiency losses. By contrast, the latter approach 
emphasizes the value-creation perspective of productive activities, starting from the 
notion that the ultimate value of productive activities is not at all known beforehand 
and has to be “discovered” to a considerable extent in the process of combining the 
assets. As a result, in the organizational-theoretic approach the scope of effective 
corporate governance is considerably larger with more emphasis on issues of strategy 
and associated contingencies than on control. 
As far as the relationship between effective corporate governance and corporate 
performance is concerned, a relatively complex picture emerges from this paper. 
Obviously, this has implications for the answer to the research question. First of all, it 
can be concluded that in case the emphasis is on value distribution, both the analysis 
of, respectively, the extended principal-agent perspective and the mediating hierarchy 
perspective on the corporation, indicate that there is no theoretical support for the 
proposition that a more formal representation of stakeholders in the board will benefit 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. Second, building upon the mediating 
hierarchy perspective and arguing against the limited scope of the extended principal-
agent perspective, it can be claimed that in stuations of multiple enfranchised 
stakeholders, it is most effective that all stakeholders give up control in order to elicit 
relationship-specific investments that may favourably affect the value of the firm. 
Similarly, it can be argued that in situations of multiple enfranchised stakeholders, it is 
more efficient to centralize decision-making power beyond the discretionary powers 
of the stakeholders.
In case the focal point of the analysis shifts to the creation and discovery of 
value, these general conclusions no longer hold. The introduction of a organizational-
theoretic perspective in corporate governance and particular in the roles the board 
introduces the commitment and loyalty of stakeholders to the firm and firm-specific 
and industry-specific experience and expertise as key soft-governance variables in the 
analysis of effective board behaviour. To the extent that these capabilities are more 
evenly distributed over different stakeholders, it may increase the effectiveness of 
governance to have these stakeholders represented in the board.
As a result, the introduction of the distinction between value creation and value 
distribution seems to create a paradox. Indeed the issue is to reconcile the need for 
centralized decision-making from the perspective of the distribution of value created, 
with the need to decentralize decision-making and to share authority viewed from the 
perspective of value creation. In our view, the solution of the paradox is precisely 
where the role of the board becomes crucial and even more important that in shaping 
the strategy of the firm or monitoring management activities. In our view, effective 
boards are able to create and maintain accountability to all stakeholders although they 
have all authority (see also Roberts/McNulty/Stiles 2005). Indeed, the challenge is to 
have available all the authority to control without the need to use it. Similarly, to 
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engage in strategy shaping without loosing the authority to control. Accountable 
board members are able to cut through these dilemma’s primarily because they have 
the expertise and attitude to associate with all the stakeholders and to challenge 
management. Formal representation rights are probably only limiting the required 
formal and informal independence of the members of the board, in this respect. 
Finally, in this paper, the effectiveness of internal corporate governance 
institutions is addressed, in particular, the board of directors. Obviously there are 
limitations to the approach of this paper, which may provide additional challenges for 
subsequent research. In the first place, this analysis of paper has addressed the issue of 
effective corporate governance. It has to be emphasized that the conclusions of this 
paper may be subject to qualification once the issue of the legitimation of institutions 
of corporate governance is also addressed (see also, Aguilera/Cuervo-Cazurra 2004). 
In the second place, there’s a considerable variety of corporate governance structures 
and the interdependence of institutions of internal and external corporate governance 
is straightforward. Furthermore, the institutions of corporate governance are them-
selves subject to changes in the wider institutional environment (e.g. changes in legis-
lation or national codes of corporate governance). These institutional changes may be 
a response to social pressures that are not related to the dynamics of the value crea-
tion process (van Ees/Postma 2005). For the sake of the argument, we, however, have 
chosen to neglect these aspects of institutional change in this paper and to primarily 
focus on the effectiveness of internal corporate governance. 
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